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Insurance
by
Stephen L. Cotter*
Stephen M. Schatz*
and
Bradley S. Wolff **

I.

INTRODUCTION

Extra-contractual issues continue to percolate in the insurance arena.
The Georgia Supreme Court resettled the law enforcing contractual suit
limitations and created a "safe harbor" for an insurer faced with
demands conditioned on terms beyond an insurer's control.1 The
Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing a nine-digit punitive
award, laid down "bright-line," conservative rules regulating punitive
considerations in extra-contractual and other situations.2
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1. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003).
2. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
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HOMEOWNER'S AND CGL INSURANCE

Suit Limitation ProvisionEnforced, Absent Fraud

Absent fraud, an insurer cannot waive the policy's contractual suit
limitation provision after the time for bringing suit has expired.3 In
Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Ogden,4 a Georgia Supreme Court
decision, a provision in the applicable policy required that any suit
against Auto-Owners be brought by the insured within one year after
the inception of the loss or damage. Auto-Owners did not deny the
insured's claim before that one-year period had expired. Instead, after
the one-year period had expired, the claims adjuster for Auto-Owners
notified the insured that his claim to recover repair costs to the firedamaged home was denied because of the suit limitation provision.5
After that notification, however, the adjuster sent a letter to the
insured's attorney stating that "'it is possible that Auto-Owners ...
would consider payment'" of repair costs.'
When the Georgia Court of Appeals issued its ruling in 2001, it
recognized the general rule that an insurer does not waive a contractual
suit limitation period by "'engaging in negotiations looking toward a
possible settlement of [a] loss or claim.'" 7 However, the court of appeals
held that a question of fact on waiver existed, so it reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.8 The claims adjuster's letter to the
insured's counsel after the suit limitation period expired stated that
Auto-Owners might consider payment, which was inconsistent with its
earlier position that the claim was denied because the one-year suit
limitation period had run. 9
Last year a court of appeals decision flew in the face of the general
rule allowing an insurer to negotiate toward a possible settlement of the
claim, despite the running of the one-year suit limitation period.' ° The

3. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Ogden, 275 Ga. 565, 569 S.E.2d 833 (2002).
4. 275 Ga. 565, 569 S.E.2d 833 (2002).
5. Id. at 565-66, 569 S.E.2d at 834.
6. Id. at 566, 569 S.E.2d at 834.
7. Ogden v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 251 Ga. App. 723, 726, 554 S.E.2d 575, 577 (2001)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-40(3) (Supp. 2003)).
8. Id. at 725-26, 554 S.E.2d at 578.
9. Id. at 726, 554 S.E.2d at 578.
10. Bradley S. Wolff et al., Insurance, 54 MERCER L. REv. 341, 361-62 (2002). In the
past, courts have found that waiver existed only when the insurer made an affirmative
promise, statement, or other act, or some constructive fraud, which led the insured to
believe that the insurer intended to enlarge the contractual suit limitation period. See
Broadfoot v. Reliance Ins. Co., 601 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 936 (11th
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Georgia Supreme Court's recent decision agrees with that analysis."
"Relying [uplon long-standing precedent, [the supreme court held] that
an ... insurance adjuster [or agent] cannot waive the [suit] limitations
provision in the insurance contract after it has expired without express
authority from the insurance company." 2 Thus, "[u]nless the [claims
representative or] agent perpetrates [a] fraud that [causes] the insured
to delay bringing [a] lawsuit until after the time for bringing [the action]
has expired, [an] insured cannot rely on the [representative's or] agent's
conduct as an excuse for the failure to sue" in a timely fashion.' 3 "Once
the time for bringing an action lapses, the forfeiture has taken place, the
contract becomes a 'dead letter,' and an [adjuster or] agent cannot revive
it by an acknowledgment or new promise."14
The court made it clear, however, that while an adjuster or agent of
the company cannot waive the suit limitation period after the time has
expired, an adjuster or agent can waive the suit limitation provision
before the time has expired when the representative, by his conduct or
communications, causes the insured to rely upon an express or implied
promise to pay the claim."'
"If the insurer never denied liability, but continually discussed the loss
with its insured with a view toward negotiation and settlement without
the intervention of a suit, whether or not this lulled the insured into
a belief that the 12-month clause in the contract was waived by the
insurer can become a disputed question of fact" for the jury. 6
Consequently, the court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of
summary judgment in the insurer's favor because sufficient questions of
fact existed regarding whether Auto-Owners and the insured had settled
the claim and whether Auto-Owners had promised to pay the outstanding amount owed for the claim
as part of the settlement before the suit
17
limitation period expired.

Cir. 1985) (holding that the contractual limitation period runs from the date of loss and
ends one year later, regardless of whether the insurer issued a denial to the insured before
the expiration of the period); Brown v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 84, 306 S.E.2d
62 (1983).
11. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 275 Ga. at 567, 569 S.E.2d at 834.
12. Id. at 565, 569 S.E.2d at 833 (footnote omitted).
13. Id. at 566, 569 S.E.2d at 834 (citing Underwriters' Agency v. Sutherlin, 55 Ga. 266
(1875)).
14. Id. (citing Graham v. Niagra Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. 840, 844, 32 S.E. 579, 581
(1899)).
15. Id. at 567, 569 S.E.2d at 835.
16. Id. (quoting Edwards v. At. Ins. Co., 203 Ga. App. 608, 611, 417 S.E.2d 410, 413
(1992)).
17. Id.
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Based upon the wealth of previous case law addressing the issue, the
Georgia Supreme Court correctly decided Auto-Owners Insurance Co."8
Regardless, to completely avoid the issue, an insurer still needs to be
cautious when making any communications with the insured, before or
after the one-year period has expired, if those communications are
inconsistent with the insurer's reliance upon the suit limitation
provision.
B. Insurance Contract Interpretation-Y2KRemediation Not Direct
Physical Loss
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted
the following language commonly found in commercial property policies:
The insurance company will provide insurance "'for direct physical loss
of, or damage to' covered property." 9 In AFLAC, Inc. v. Chubb & Son,
Inc.,2 "AFLAC sought declaratory relief as to coverage and damages
under [its] two Chubb contracts of all-risk property insurance for [the]
remediation costs incurred upon converting its computer systems [to
avoid] the Year 2000 ('Y2K') computer problem."2 ' Chubb's policies
provided all-risk personal property coverage "'for direct physical loss of,
or damage to' covered property."2 2 AFLAC's computer systems constituted covered property under the policies. Therefore, the issue for the
court was whether costs incurred in anticipation of the Y2K problem
constituted direct physical loss or damage.2" Relying upon the relevant
rules of insurance contract construction, the court of appeals determined
that the term "direct physical loss or damage"24 "contemplates an
actual change in insured property then in a satisfactory state, occasioned
by accident or other fortuitous event directly upon the property causing
it to become unsatisfactory for future use or requiring that repairs be
made to make it so."25 Because the inability of AFLAC's computer
systems to process twenty-first century dates existed from the time the
systems were created, and because the remediated computer systems
successfully avoided any Y2K problems, the court determined that no

18.
S.E.2d
(1978);
19.
(2003)
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. (citing Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 126 Ga. App. 640, 642, 191
557, 558 (1972); Lee v. Safeco Ins. Co., 144 Ga. App. 519, 521, 241 S.E.2d 627, 629
Edwards, 203 Ga. App. at 611, 417 S.E.2d at 413 (footnotes omitted)).
AFLAC, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 306, 307, 581 S.E.2d 317, 318
(quoting Chubb's International Commercial Policy).
260 Ga. App. 306, 581 S.E.2d 317 (2003).
Id. at 306, 581 S.E.2d at 317.
Id. at 307, 581 S.E.2d at 318 (quoting Chubb's International Commercial Policy).
Id.
Id. (quoting Chubb's Financial Institutions Policy).
Id. at 308, 581 S.E.2d at 319.
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direct physical loss or damage resulted from a fortuitous event. 26
Therefore, the trial court's denial of AFLAC's motion for summary
judgment was affirmed.2 7
The ruling in AFLAC is not limited to claims for remediation costs
related to the Y2K problem.2" The ruling stands for the proposition
that an insured is not entitled to coverage when it seeks "no more than
an ordinary cost of doing business ... ."29 Business property policies
do not afford coverage for costs incurred to improve or better business
property when no loss or damage has occurred as a result of a fortuitous
event.3 °
C. Application MisrepresentationIncreasingly a Jury Question
In light of Lively v. Southern Heritage Insurance Co., 3 1 insurance
companies will find it more difficult to prevail on a motion for summary
judgment based upon misrepresentations by an insured in the insurance
application, particularly when the insurer does not treat the policy as
void from its inception and does not refund all premiums to the insured.
In Lively Southern Heritage moved for summary judgment based upon
misrepresentations that the insureds made in their application for
homeowner's insurance. Specifically, the application asked whether the
insureds previously had any insurance declined, cancelled, or not
renewed in the last three years and whether the insureds had any prior
loss history. The insureds answered those questions negatively.
However, the insureds had been refused a renewal of a previous
homeowner's policy due to a fire within three years of the date of the
application.
Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Southern Heritage, the court of appeals determined that Southern
Heritage failed to "demonstrate both [that the insureds] made ...
misrepresentations and that the misrepresentations were material from
the view of a prudent insurer." 3 The court of appeals reiterated:
In order to void a policy of insurance for misrepresentation in the
application, the insurer must show that the representation was false
and that it was material in that it changed the nature, extent, or

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 308-09, 581 S.E.2d at 320.
Id. at 309, 581 S.E.2d at 320.
See id.
Id.
Id.
256 Ga. App. 195, 568 S.E.2d 98 (2002).
Id. at 195, 568 S.E.2d at 99.
Id. at 196, 568 S.E.2d at 100.
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character of the risk. A material misrepresentation is one that would
influence aprudentinsurer in determining whether or not to accept the
risk, or in fixing a different amount of premium in the event of such
acceptance. 4
Because the standard is objective, "the issue of materiality is ordinarily
a question for the jury, unless the evidence excludes every reasonable
inference except that it was material, in which case it becomes a
question of law for the court.""
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Southern Heritage
submitted the underwriter's affidavit "stating that she would not have
approved the policy if she had known of the prior fire losses and the
nonrenewal." s The court held that the affidavit did not effectively
remove all genuine issues of material fact. 7 "The affidavit [did] not set
forth any bright-line company policies stating that coverage [would be]
denied if a prior nonrenewal or prior losses exist[ed]."" Instead, the
affidavit "contain[ed] only the underwriter's blanket statements that she
would not have issued the policy if she had known of the [insureds']
prior history."3 9 In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the
insureds submitted "an expert's affidavit [for the proposition] that prior
nonrenewals and losses do not automatically preclude coverage, but
rather ... insurance companies will consider [numerous] factors in
determining whether to [issue a policy]." 4°
Therefore, while the
insurance application did contain false representations by the insureds,
"ajury question [remained] on the issue of whether the false statements
in the... application would be material to [the] prudent insurer."4 1
In addition, the court of appeals held that genuine issues of material
fact existed concerning whether Southern Heritage waived its defense
that the policy is void ab initio; therefore, summary judgment in favor
of the insurance company was improper.4 2 This holding was based on
the fact that
Southern Heritage [discovered] the misrepresentations in the application... shortly after the fire occurred, but it did not take the position

34. Id. (quoting Jackson Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Snead, 231 Ga. App. 406, 410, 499 S.E.2d
173, 176 (1998)).
35. Id. (citing Snead, 231 Ga. App. at 410, 499 S.E.2d at 176).
36. Id. at 195-96, 568 S.E.2d at 100.
37. Id. at 196, 568 S.E.2d at 100.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 196-97, 568 S.E.2d at 100.
42. Id. at 198, 568 S.E.2d at 101.

2003]

INSURANCE

283

that the policy was void as a result of those misrepresentations until
after suit was filed one year later .... In the interim, Southern
Heritage continued to investigate the claim, while purporting to
reserve all defenses."
The investigation included a request that the insureds produce
documentation to support their claim, in reliance upon the conditions set
forth in the policy." Moreover, the court held that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding the insurer's waiver because Southern
Heritage did not refund the premium once it determined that the policy
was void ab initio.4 1 "[T]he failure to return premiums is a factor ...
waived [a] defense
in determining whether an insurance company has
4
by treating the policy as an enforceable contract."
The decision in Lively has significant ramifications for insurance
companies seeking to hold a policy void ab initio as a result of application fraud. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment using the
application fraud defense, the insurer must submit an affidavit by its
underwriter, which is very specific and shows that the misrepresentations would be material to a prudent insurer.47 In addition, once the
company discovers that misrepresentations have been made in the
application, the decision should be made, at that time, to treat the policy
Any further investigation into the claim can potentially
as void."
create a waiver, even if the company reserves its rights under the
policy.49 Moreover, an insurance company would be well-advised to
refund the full premium once it determines that material misrepresentations have been made in the application.5"
The decision in Lively only addresses one of the three bases for finding
a policy void for application fraud: i.e., that the misrepresentation was
material. The Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sec-

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 198-99, 568 S.E.2d at 101.
46. Id. at 197, 568 S.E.2d at 101. The court noted, however, that when the insurer
contends the insured has committed fraud in proving his claim, as opposed to applying for
insurance, the insurer is not required to refund the premium. "Under those circumstances,
...the insurer had earned the premiums because it had assumed the risk of coverage of
all legitimate claims." Id. at 199, 568 S.E.2d at 102 (citing Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Hall, 196
Ga. App. 349, 395 S.E.2d 851 (1990)).
47. Id. at 196, 568 S.E.2d at 100.
48. Id. at 197, 568 S.E.2d at 100 (citing Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Mulkey, 146
Ga. 267, 91 S.E. 106 (1916)).
49. Id. at 198, 568 S.E.2d at 101.
50. Id. at 197, 568 S.E.2d at 101 (citing Thompson v. Permanent Gen. Assurance Corp.,
238 Ga. App. 450, 519 S.E.2d 249 (1999)).
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tion 33-24-7(b)51 provides three types of misrepresentations that can
void a policy:
(1) [f]raudulent; (2) [m]aterial either to the acceptance of the risk or to
the hazard assumed by the insurer; or (3) [tlhe insurer in good faith
would either not have issued the policy or contract or would not have
issued a policy or contract in as large an amount or at the premium
rate as applied for or would not have provided coverage with respect
to the hazard resulting in the loss if the true facts had been known to
the insurer as required
either by the application for the policy or
2
contract or otherwise.5
While the first two bases are typically questions for a jury, the third
basis may provide insurance companies with stronger grounds for
obtaining summary judgment. The insurance company will still need to
show that the misrepresentation was material.5 3 However, if it can
prove the applicability of the third basis, the company has a solid
argument that, by the very nature of the type of misrepresentation, the
company has satisfied its burden of showing the misrepresentation was
material.54 The company's argument is strengthened if the underwriter's affidavit is uncontradicted by the insured."
Lively also ignores previous decisions, which held that misrepresentations regarding previous claim history and insurance cancellations are
material as a matter of law.56 Therefore, absent the waiver issue, the
court could have held that summary judgment in favor of the insurer
was proper.

III. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
A.

Uninsured Motorist Insurance

1. Stacking UM Coverage. Under the Georgia uninsured motorist
("UM") statute," UM insurers are obligated "to pay the insured all
sums which said insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits

51. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7(b) (1996).
52. Id.
53. See Nappier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 961 F.2d 168, 169 (11th Cir. 1992).
54. Id.
55. See Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pritchett, 220 Ga. App. 430, 432-33, 469 S.E.2d
199, 202 (1995).
56. See Brannon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 120 Ga. App. 467, 171 S.E.2d 319 (1969); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 107 Ga. App. 348, 130 S.E.2d 144 (1963).
57. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
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[as required by the statute or policy]."58 Insureds are allowed to "stack"
or add together the UM limits of all available policies up to the amount
of their damages.59 In Horace Mann Insurance Corp. v. Mercer,6" the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that the UM statute allows such stacking
of coverage even when the applicable policies specifically limit the total
coverage to the highest limit of liability available under a single
policy.61 Plaintiff was insured by four policies of UM coverage, each
containing the following limitation clause: "'If two or more policies
issued by us to you apply to the same accident, the total limit of liability
under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy with the
highest limit of liability.' ' 62 While insurance companies are free to
contract for limitations of coverage and may even bar the stacking of
coverage within a single policy, the limitations may not limit or deny
coverage required by law.63 In Horace Mann the court of appeals held
that the purported prohibition against stacking contained in the multiple
policies of UM coverage violated the UM statute by attempting to
"thwart the insured's ability to recover 'all sums' the insured is legally
entitled to recover." 4 The court pointed out, however, that when a
single insurance policy covering different vehicles is involved, the insurer
may prohibit
stacking of multiple coverages contained within the single
6
policy.
2. UM Stacking-Priority of Coverage. In another case involving
the stacking of UM insurance policies, the court of appeals decided the
priority of coverage between two UM policies with the same named
insured. When more than one policy of UM coverage is available to
an injured insured, "the priority of the multiple UM [policies] must be
determined."67 Two tests have been developed to determine priority
among UM policies: the "receipt of premium" test and the "more closely
identified with" test.6 8 If the insured paid the premiums for one of the
available policies, but not the other(s), then the carrier that received the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
(1991).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 33-7-11(a)(1).
Horace Mann Ins. Corp. v. Mercer, 257 Ga. App. 278, 570 S.E.2d 589 (2002).
257 Ga. App. 278, 570 S.E.2d 589 (2002).
Id. at 280, 570 S.E.2d at 590.
Id. at 278, 570 S.E.2d at 589 (emphasis omitted).
See McCombs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 200 Ga. App. 28, 406 S.E.2d 549
HoraceMann, 257 Ga. App. at 279, 570 S.E.2d at 590.
Id., 570 S.E.2d at 589.
Canal Ins. Co. v. Merchant, 225 Ga. App. 61, 483 S.E.2d 311 (1997).
Id. at 62, 483 S.E.2d at 312.
Id.
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premium from the insured must provide primary coverage. 9 Otherwise, the primary policy will be the one more closely identified with the
insured.70 But what happens when both policies providing coverage are
issued to the same named insured and the insured paid the premiums
for both policies?
That question was answered, at least in part, in Great Divide
Insurance Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co. 71 The insured paid premiums to
both Safeco and Great Divide. The Safeco policy was issued to the
insured as a household policy, and the Great Divide policy was issued to
the insured for his trucking business. The insured paid the premiums
on and was equally closely identified with each policy 7 The court of
appeals held that the tie would be broken by the circumstances of the
incident in which the injury occurred.73 Because the insured was
operating a dump truck for business purposes at the time of the
accident, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment.74 The court of appeals held that the insured was more
closely identified with the policy issued to the trucking business than
with the household policy.75 Therefore, the Great Divide policy was
primarily responsible for any damages sustained in the collision.76
3. UM Limits--Whether Subrogation Claims Reduce Insurance
"Available." In Thurman v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance
Co.," the court of appeals held that payments by a liability insurance
carrier to subrogees of the injured plaintiff did not reduce the coverage
"available" to the UM insured plaintiff, a United States postal carrier
who was injured in a collision.78 The insured tortfeasor had a $100,000
total liability limit policy. The tortfeasor's insurer paid for the property
damage to the postal truck in the amount of $4,445.81. Plaintiff and her
husband settled with the tortfeasor's insurer for the remaining balance
of the policy, $95,554.19. As a result of her on-the-job injury, plaintiff
received $34,666.32 in workers' compensation benefits from the United
States Postal Service and group medical insurance benefits. The postal
service and health insurer were subrogated to the injured party's claims,

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
260 Ga. App. 531, 580 S.E.2d 313 (2003).
Id. at 531, 580 S.E.2d at 313.
Id. at 532, 580 S.E.2d at 313.
Id., 580 S.E.2d at 314.
Id.
Id.
260 Ga. App. 338, 579 S.E.2d 746 (2003).
Id. at 340, 579 S.E.2d at 748.
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and the tortfeasor's carrier paid the subrogation claims jointly to
plaintiff and the subrogees. This left $60,887.87 in net proceeds to
plaintiff. Plaintiff had three policies of UM insurance issued by State
Farm. The policies, stacked together, provided $75,000 in UM benefits.
Plaintiff contended that she was entitled to $14,112.13 from State Farm
because the payments to the subrogees reduced the amount of coverage
available under the tortfeasor's policy. 79 O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(b)(1)
(D)(ii) "defines an '[ulninsured motor vehicle' as one where ... the
[tortfeasor's] 'available coverages' ... are less than the limits of the
uninsured motorist coverage provided under the insured's insurance
policy ....,o "The statute [further] define[s] 'available coverages' as
the policy limits 'less any amounts by which the maximum amounts
payable under such limits of coverage have, by reason of payment of
other claims or otherwise, been reduced below the limits of coverage."'' 1
The court of appeals then questioned "whether the two subrogation
payments constitute 'payments of other claims or otherwise' that have
reduced the 'maximum amounts payable under [the] limits of coverage.'"8 2 The court found this to be a question of first impression in
Georgia and held that the phrase "payments of other claims" meant only
the payment of claims by the tortfeasor's insurer to other persons who
sustained damages in the same accident.8 3 Because the subrogees'
claims were made in place of the injured party, those payments did not
qualify as payments of other claims under the statute. 4 Although
plaintiff had UM insurance limits greater than the amount she was able
to recover directly from the tortfeasor's insurer, because the payments
made to and on behalf of the injured party exceeded the UM limits, the
tortfeasor was not underinsured.8"
4. UM Practice and Procedure-Default. In Williams v. Safeway
Insurance Co.,86 the court of appeals held that when a UM carrier
answers and defends a case in its own name, the plaintiff has "the
threshold burden to prove '(1) the existence of a policy of liability
insurance containing uninsured motorist protection, and (2) that [the

79.
80.
2003)).
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 338-39, 579 S.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 339, 579 S.E.2d at 747 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii) (2000 & Supp.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis added)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. §§ 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii)).
Id.
Id. at 340, 579 S.E.2d at 747-48.
Id.
223 Ga. App. 93, 94, 476 S.E.2d 850, 851 (1996).
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defendant driver] was an uninsured motorist at the time of the
[collision]. "'t
In Anthony v. Larrios,8 the court of appeals addressed
whether the plaintiff is relieved of his burden when he specifically
pleads that the defendant driver was uninsured at the time of the
accident, that allegation is deemed admitted by the driver's failure to
answer, and a default judgment is entered against him."9 Generally,
admissions made by the default of an uninsured motorist do not bind an
uninsured motorist carrier.9 ° Thus, the court held in Anthony that
although plaintiff specifically pleaded that the tortfeasor was uninsured,
and this allegation was admitted by the tortfeasor by virtue of his
default, that admission did not relieve plaintiff of the burden of proving
the tortfeasor was uninsured at the time of the collision.9 ' Moreover,
"'courts cannot presume that the tortfeasor was an uninsured motorist.'"92 Therefore, plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence showing the
tortfeasor was uninsured at the time of the collision resulted in
affirmation of judgment notwithstanding the verdict granted to the UM
carrier after a jury returned a verdict against the insurer and defendant
driver.93
5. Declaratory Judgment-Practice and Procedure. In Morgan
v. Guaranty National Cos.," the Georgia Supreme Court held that an
insurer may not bring a declaratory judgment action when it has denied
coverage for a collision and refused to provide a defense, because the
"insurer needs no declaration to guide it as to any future action." 95
However, in Colonial Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance
Co.,96 the court of appeals held that when an insurer denies collision
coverage, yet proceeds to defend the insured under a reservation of
rights, a declaratory judgment action may be appropriate to determine
97
whether the insurer is required to provide coverage to the insured.

87. Id. at 94,476 S.E.2d at 851 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Studebaker,
139 Ga. App. 386, 387, 228 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1976)).
88. 256 Ga. App. 248, 568 S.E.2d 135 (2002).
89. Id. at 248, 568 S.E.2d at 136.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 248-49, 568 S.E.2d at 136-37.
92. Id. at 249, 568 S.E.2d at 137 (quotingHartfordAccident, 139 Ga. App. at 388, 228
S.E.2d at 323).
93. Id.
94. 268 Ga. 343, 489 S.E.2d 803 (1997).
95. Id. at 344, 489 S.E.2d at 805.
96. 252 Ga. App. 391, 556 S.E.2d 486 (2001).
97. Id. at 391, 556 S.E.2d at 487.
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The court's decision in Colonial was reaffirmed during the survey
period in Direct General Insurance Co. v. Drawdy.98 In Drawdy the
insurer had written letters to the insured denying coverage for the
underlying collision because the insured vehicle was driven by a
nonpermissive user during a high-speed chase while evading the police.
Despite the position taken by the insurer in its letters, when the
accident victim filed an action for damages, the insurer defended the suit
under a reservation of rights. The insurer filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment, seeking a determination of the viability of the
nonpermissive use clause in its policy. The trial court granted the
insured's motion for summary judgment and the insurer appealed.99
Relying on Colonial, the court of appeals reversed and held that the
declaratory judgment action was proper.10 0
Also in Drawdy, discovery revealed that the vehicle owner, knowing
the driver had no license, allowed the driver to use the car. The insurer
then amended its complaint for declaratory judgment, contending that
it could deny coverage because of an unlicensed driver exclusion in the
policy.101 The court of appeals held that "a declaratory judgment
action [may be] amend[ed] to add a different ground for relief from that
relied on in the original complaint."0 2
IV.

A.

LIFE, HEALTH

& DISABILITY INSURANCE

Life Insurance

In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that "a variable life insurance policy is a
'covered security' under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 ('SLUSA')." °3 In Herndon v. Equitable Variable Life Insurance
Co., 104 a fifteen-year-old had been issued a variable life insurance
policy. She was charged higher premiums because she had used tobacco
and sought to prosecute a class action in state court. The case was
removed and then dismissed pursuant to SLUSA. °5 The Eleventh

98. 258 Ga. App. 149, 572 S.E.2d 629 (2002).
99. Id. at 149-50, 572 S.E.2d at 630-31.
100. Id. at 151, 572 S.E.2d at 632.
101. Id. at 149, 572 S.E.2d at 631.
102. Id. at 151, 572 S.E.2d at 632. See Peterson v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 203
Ga. App. 745, 747, 417 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1992).
103. Herndon v. Equitable Variable Life Ins. Co., 325 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003);
15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f) (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441, 1446 (2000).
104. 325 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 1253.
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Circuit noted that several circuits have held that variable annuities,
without a life insurance component, were covered securities under
SLUSA.' °6 Consistent with the district court's decision and three other
district court decisions,'0 7 the Eleventh Circuit held that "a variable
life insurance policy account add[ing] a life insurance component to the
investment does not negate the fact that the statutory requirements of
SLUSA have been met with regard to the annuity component ... ."108
Hence, plaintiff's purported class action alleging fault with the life
insurance component of a variable life insurance policy was subject to
dismissal under SLUSA. 10 9
In a creditor-friendly decision with a wealth of legislative and
regulatory support, a panel of the Georgia Court of Appeals held in
Printis v. Bankers Life Insurance Co.,"' that the "indebtedness" upon
which life insurance could be based included not only the principal but
also the anticipated interest."' The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's awarding judgment on the pleadings to Bankers Life and held
that Georgia law allowed Bankers Life to base its insurance premium on
the total indebtedness, including finance charges, over the life of the
loan, rather than just the principal."'
The court held that the
O.C.G.A. section 33-31-1" 3 definition of indebtedness was consistent

with the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act"' because both
defined indebtedness as the total amount payable in the schedule of payments.'15 The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act," 6 which limits the
ability to collect unearned interest, does not require a different result.17
B.

Health Insurance
In a detailed Rule 23"" analysis opinion from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Judge Julie Carnes
106. Id. at 1254.
107. Id. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (E.D.N.Y.
2002); In re Lutheran Bhd. Variable Ins. Prod. Co. Sales, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040 (D.
Minn. 2000); Lasley v. New England Variable Life Ins. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
108. Herndon, 325 F.3d at 1254.
109. Id.
110. 256 Ga. App. 266, 568 S.E.2d 85 (2002).
111. Id. at 268, 568 S.E.2d at 87.
112. Id. at 267, 568 S.E.2d at 87.
113. O.C.G.A. § 33-31-1 (2000).
114. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(r) (2000).
115. Printis, 256 Ga. App. at 268, 568 S.E.2d at 87.
116. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-30 (2000).
117. Id.
118. FED. R. Cwy. P. 23.
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ultimately granted class certification to a national class of female WalMart employees covered by Wal-Mart's health insurance plan who had
used prescription contraceptives, for which the plan wrongfully denied
reimbursement.119 In Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,121 plaintiff
sought to redress Wal-Mart's discriminatory failure to reimburse
prescription contraceptives as a part of Wal-Mart's health insurance.
Rather than denying class treatment, the court substantially narrowed
the proposed class to enable the class action mechanism to deal with the
alleged improper discrimination in the most efficient and effective
manner.' 21
Trimmed from the proposed class were those who
"'wish[ed] to use' prescription contraceptives ... ," spouses of Wal-Mart
employees, and others. 1 22 This opinion and certification is consistent
with Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 12 in which a district court in
Washington similarly certified a class action for female employees who
used prescription contraceptives
while enrolled under their employer's
124
health insurance plan.
C. Disability
Using the Georgia Supreme Court's response to a certified question,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted in
Hallum v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. 125 that one "who
unexpectedly suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome brought on by years
of intentional repetitive hand motions," 26 still sustains an "accidental
bodily injur[y]" 127 within the meaning of a disability policy and is
entitled to a lifetime of coverage. 12
Whether the carpal tunnel
syndrome was classified as an "injury" or "sickness" under Provident's
policy made the difference between a lifetime of coverage and merely
29
four years of benefits.

119. Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-2755-JEC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21024, at *1, *54 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002).
120. No. 1:01-CV-2755-JEC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21024 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002).
121. Id. at *52.
122. Id. at *24.
123. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (WD. Wash. 2001).
124. Id. at 1268.
125. 326 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 2003).
126. Id. at 1375.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1376.
129. Hallum v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir.
2002).
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In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals discussed,
in Winters v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 130 the distinction
between insurance coverage for accidental injuries and those caused by
accidental means."' An accidental injury is unexpected but may arise
from a conscious voluntary act. 13 2 A contrasting term, not used in the
Provident policy, is "accidental means," in which both the injury and the
act causing the injury must be involuntary and unintentional. 3
The
court of appeals noted disallowance of coverage under similar language
when the injury was caused by the voluntary ingestion of alcohol."3
The Provident Life policy focused on the injury, not the means which
actually caused the injury.'3 This result would seem to pave the way
for broader disability coverage for carpal tunnel syndrome and/or
modification of policy language.
In another case of first impression in Georgia, the court of appeals
held in Corbin v.Regions Bank' 36 that "a creditor is obligated to seek
payment under a credit disability insurance policy sold"' 3' as a part of
the credit transaction.' 8 The court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to Regions Bank because the creditor had an
affirmative duty to seek payment under a credit disability insurance
policy sold as a part of the credit transaction before repossessing the
vehicle.139 Earl Corbin purchased a truck from Duvall Ford, and, as
part of that transaction, paid over $1000 for credit disability insurance.
Corbin was unable to make full payments after a series of serious
illnesses. He received a notice of repossession from Regions, relinquished the vehicle, and advised Regions that he was disabled. He
defended against a deficiency suit based upon the creditor's failure to
seek payment under the credit disability insurance.'4 ° The court of
appeals rejected the trial court's finding that Corbin had submitted
voluntarily to repossession.'
Additionally, the court held that "a jury
could find that no default occurred [because] the [original] agreement
contemplated that the credit disability insurance would remedy Corbin's

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

209 Ga. App. 369, 433 S.E.2d 363 (1993).
Id. at 369, 433 S.E.2d at 363.
Id. at 370, 433 S.E.2d at 364.

Id.
Id.
Hallum,289 F.3d at 1353.
258 Ga. App. 490, 574 S.E.2d 616 (2002).
Id. at 494, 574 S.E.2d at 620.
Id.
Id. at 492-93, 574 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 490-92, 574 S.E.2d at 617-18.
Id. at 495, 574 S.E.2d at 621.
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[possible] inability to pay" the indebtedness. 14 2 Hence, creditors in
Georgia and elsewhere are held to a higher standard of diligence,
requiring them to seek payment under credit disability insurance
policies that are part of the original indebtedness they are seeking to
enforce.1, 3 However, the trial court disallowed Corbin's state court
defamation claim.'" The court of appeals held that "[t]he Federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act[.45] preempts state defamation laws to the extent
that [they] are inconsistent with ... the [federal act]."'4 6 The federal
act 47 requires not only that false information be furnished, but also
that the "information [be] furnished with malice or wilful intent to injure
[the] consumer." 48
V.

EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY

A. Bad Faithor Negligent Failureto Settle-A Limited Safe Harbor
Created
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed
whether an insurer is liable for bad faith and negligent refusal to settle
a claim or lawsuit against its insured when the insurer failed to tender
its policy limits because plaintiff's demand contained a condition beyond
the insurer's control. 49 In Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Brightman,5 ' the court held
that an insurance company in a case involving multiple insurers may
be liable to its insured [for] bad faith [and negligent refusal to settle a]
claim when it fails to tender its policy limits in response to a settlement offer solely because the offer also seeks the policy limits from
other insurers. 5'

142. Id. at 493, 574 S.E.2d at 619-20 (citing Rogers v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 247
Ga. App. 631, 632, 545 S.E.2d 51, 53 (2001)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(t) (2000).
146. Corbin, 258 Ga. App. at 497, 574 S.E.2d at 622 (quoting Gibson v. Decatur Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 235 Ga. App. 160, 164, 508 S.E.2d 788, 792 (1998)).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(h)(e) (2000).
148. Corbin, 258 Ga. App. at 497, 574 S.E.2d at 622 (quoting Gibson, 235 Ga. App. at
164, 508 S.E.2d at 792).
149. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003).
150. 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003).
151. Id. at 683, 580 S.E.2d at 520.
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152
Because Cotton States and Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt
will become the seminal cases on the issue of an insurer's bad faith
failure to settle, the facts forming the basis of the court's decisions merit
detailed discussion.

Brightman was seriously injured .. . when [a] van owned by Martin
and driven by Cumbo struck his car as he was turning left at an
intersection .... Police charged Brightman with failure to yield the
right of way and charged Cumbo with speeding and causing serious
injury by a vehicle. Police later charged Cumbo with driving under the
influence .... "'
At the time of the collision, Martin had an automobile liability
insurance policy from Cotton States with a liability limit of $300,000.
On January 31, 1994, Brightman's counsel offered in writing to settle
Brightman's claims against Martin and Cumbo for payment by Cotton
States of $300,000.'"4
"The letter [stated] that Brightman had
sustained traumatic brain injury and attached medical bills totaling
$329,457.20. "1'5
On April 20, 1994, Cotton States declined to accept the [settlement
offer] citing a police officer's testimony that Brightman caused the
accident, the company's inability to discover how a second officer
[determined] Cumbo's speed, and its desire to await the outcome of
Cumbo's
DUI case. [Consequently,] Brightman withdrew his offer to
56
settle.1
Shortly thereafter, Brightman sued Martin and Cumbo. Through
discovery, the parties learned that Cumbo also had a personal automobile liability policy, with a limit of $100,000, through State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.'57 "The investigating officers testified
in depositions that the collision was caused by [a combination of]
Brightman's failure to yield the right of way and Cumbo's speeding and
driving under the influence."15
In January 1995, a nonbinding
arbitration panel found in Brightman's favor and awarded him $2
million.159

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).
Cotton States, 276 Ga. at 683, 580 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 683-84, 580 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 683, 580 S.E.2d at 520.
Id.
Id. at 683-84, 580 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 684, 580 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 687, 580 S.E.2d at 522.
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Following the arbitration award, Brightman, on January 30, 1995,
again offered to settle the case if Cotton States would pay its policy
limits of $300,000 within ten days. However, Brightman's written offer
was contingent upon State Farm also tendering its limits of $100,000.
Neither Cotton States nor State Farm tendered its policy limits before
the offer's ten-day period expired.6 ° On March 17,. 1995, Cotton States
reconsidered its position and offered "to pay its policy limits ... in
exchange for a general release ... and a dismissal of the complaint with
prejudice."' 61 State Farm did not accept the terms, so Brightman
declined Cotton States's offer.1" 2
At trial, the jury awarded Brightman damages for personal injury in
the amount of $1,787,500.163 Cotton States then paid its policy limits
of $300,000, and State Farm paid its policy limits of $100,000, "leaving
an excess judgment of $1,387,500 against Martin and Cumbo."'"
Martin then assigned her claim against Cotton States for its bad faith
and negligent refusal to settle the action within the policy limits to
Brightman. Brightman sued Cotton States, and the jury returned a
verdict awarding Brightman over $2 million in principal and inter1 65
est.
Relying on authority in Georgia and other jurisdictions throughout the
country, the court of appeals in a majority decision, held that Cotton
States had an "affirmative duty ... to engage the injured party in
discussions regarding an initial settlement demand in excess of policy
limits." 66 The court determined that the evidence supported the jury's
finding that Cotton States was negligent or acted in bad faith in failing
to settle the personal injury action because Cotton States did not
"respon[d] to Brightman's conditional offer with a counteroffer [to settle
the case]." 6 '
Cotton States appealed on the grounds that the ruling made "an
insurer liable for failing to offer its policy limits in response to a
contingent demand that cannot be accepted. It argue[d] that it never
had the opportunity to settle ... because the plaintiffs demand

160. Id. at 684, 580 S.E.2d at 520.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 684, 580 S.E.2d at 521.
166. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 256 Ga. App. 451, 454, 568 S.E.2d 498,
500-01 (2002) (citing Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 324 A.2d 906 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974); Young v. Am. Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969)).
167. Id. at 454, 568 S.E.2d at 500.
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contained a condition beyond its control." 6 ' Courts in Georgia and
throughout the country have generally held that when an insurer could
not have successfully effectuated a settlement within the policy limits
even if it had attempted to do so, then it cannot be held liable in bad
faith for failure to promptly attempt to negotiate a settlement within
policy limits.'69
In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court cited the well-established
principle that "[an insurance company [can] be liable for the excess
judgment entered against its insured based on the insurer's bad faith or
negligent refusal to settle a . . .claim within the policy limits." 170 An
"insurer is negligent in failing to settle if the ordinar[y] prudent insurer
would [believe that] choosing to try the case [instead of settling it]
created an unreasonable risk"' 71 to the insured which would not
adequately take into account the best interests of the insured. 72 "The
rationale is that the interests of the insurer and insured diverge when
a plaintiff offers to settle a claim for the limits of the insurance
policy."

73

While "[t]he insured is interested in protecting [him]self

against an excess judgment[,] the insurer [does not have the same]
incentive to settle because litigation may
result in a verdict [less than]
" 174
the policy limits or a defense verdict.

168. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. at 686, 580 S.E.2d at 521-22.
169. See, e.g., Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Gingold, 249 Ga. 156, 288 S.E.2d 557 (1982)
(affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment to insurer in excess liability action
when insured's deliberate disappearance made settlement of underlying action impossible);
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fields, 106 Ga. App. 740, 128 S.E.2d 358 (1962) (holding that
there was no cause of action based on the insurer's failure to solicit or make settlement
offer at the insured's request); Gen. Cas. Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964)
(holding insurer's failure to settle a presumptively strong case and its failure to appeal
judgment because its policy obligation had been completed was not bad faith conduct);
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 741 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding primary
carrier's refusal to initiate settlement offers within its policy limits was not proximate
cause of excess carrier's liability); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 194 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. Ill.
1963) (holding insurer's conduct in multiple-party suit representing insurer and others and
its failure to initiate negotiations was not negligence); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding primary insurer's refusal to
offer settlement within its policy is good faith conduct when its insured's inability is
unclear).
170. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. at 684, 580 S.E.2d at 521 (citing
McCall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 869, 870, 310 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1984)).
171. Id. at 685, 580 S.E.2d at 521.
172. Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d 809,
aft'd, 223 Ga. 789, 158 S.E.2d 243 (1967).
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 107[2] (1993)).
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In Cotton States the supreme court relied heavily upon its decision in
Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt,'7 5 which addressed whether
the insured had a bad faith claim against her insurance company for its
failure to accept plaintiff's time-limited settlement offer within the policy
limits. 17 6 In Holt the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the insurer had a duty to its insured to respond to the
plaintiff's deadline to settle the personal injury claim within policy
limits when the insurer had knowledge of clear liability and special
damages exceeding the policy limits. [The court's] holding in Holt was
consistent with the general rule that the issue of an insurer's bad faith
depends on whether the insurance company acted reasonably in
responding to a settlement offer.177
Despite the fact that the settlement offer was a conditional demand,
the court concluded that such a conditional demand did not entitle
Cotton States to a directed verdict on the bad faith or negligent failure
to settle claim at trial.' 78 Instead, Brightman presented a jury question: Whether Cotton States had an adequate opportunity to settle and,
therefore, acted unreasonably in refusing to tender its policy limits in
response to the settlement offer."' Several facts influenced the court's
decision.8 0 First, Brightman presented expert testimony at trial that
Cotton States had the opportunity to make an effective settlement offer
by offering its limits before the ten-day deadline passed without
determining whether State Farm would do so as well."'1 Second, the
"industry experts [testified] that, in cases involving multiple defendants
and insurance companies, one insurance company can offer its policy
limits in response to a demand.., and then let the plaintiff negotiate
with the remaining insurers."8 2 The court appears to have been
particularly swayed by this testimony, as the testimony was confirmed
by
Cotton States'[s] ...tendering [of] its policy limits six weeks after the
...deadline expired, despite State Farm's continuing refusal to pay.
If Cotton States had tendered its policy limits while the plaintiff's offer
was pending, it would have done everything within its control to accept

175.
176.
177.
S.E.2d
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.; 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).
S. Gen., 262 Ga. at 267, 416 S.E.2d at 274.
Cotton States, 276 Ga. at 685, 580 S.E.2d at 521 (citing Holt, 262 Ga. at 269, 416
at 276).
Id. at 687, 580 S.E.2d at 522.
Id.
See id. at 686, 580 S.E.2d at 522.
Id.
Id.
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the plaintiff's offer and thus protect its policyholder from an excess
verdict." 3
The court believed that had Cotton States tendered its policy limits, then
it "would have given equal consideration to its insured's financial
interests and fulfilled its duty to her.""s
Cotton States's action in
tendering its policy limits after the deadline expired, despite State
Farm's refusal to do so, showed that Cotton States had no excuse for not
doing so within the ten-day deadline after the initial offer.'8 5
The court further found sufficient "evidence to support the jury's
verdict that Cotton States breached its duty ... to settle [the]
claim."" 6 Such evidence included the facts that, "[b]y the time of the
offer, Cotton States knew that the police had concluded that [Cumbo]
was partially responsible for the collision, Brightman's damages
exceeded the limits of [the] policy. . ., and a court-ordered arbitration
panel had
rendered a[n] ... award of $2 million in Brightman's
18 7
favor."
However, the supreme court ruled that the court of appeals went too
far in describing an insurer's duty to settle. 8 8 Contrary to the court
of appeals ruling, an insurance company does not have "an affirmative
duty ... to engage in negotiations concerning a settlement demand
[solely because the demand] is in excess of the insurance policy's
limits."' 89 Moreover, insurers do not have
a duty .. .to make a counteroffer to every settlement demand that
involves a condition beyond their control. Instead, ... an insurance
company faced with a demand involving multiple insurers can create
a safe harbor from liability for an insured's bad faith claim under Holt
by meeting the portion of the demand over which it has control, thus
doing what it can to effectuate the settlement of the claims against its
insured.'
Cotton States will have substantial ramifications for the insurance
industry. The supreme court has sought to achieve a balance between
"protect[ing] the financial interests of policyholders in cases where
continued litigation [will] expose them to a judgment exceeding their

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. E:t
687, 580 S.E.2d at 522.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fields, 106 Ga. App. 740, 742, 128 S.E.2d
358, 359 (1962)).
190. Id.
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policy limits while [at the same time] protecting insurers from bad faith
claims when there are conditions involved in the settlement demand over
which they have no control."1 91 The court kept intact the rule that an
insurer, in considering whether to tender policy limits, has the right to
investigate and analyze whether a potential verdict would exceed its
limits (i.e., the case in which there is no clear liability or in which the
extent and value of the damages or injuries are less than the policy
limits).192 The question of bad faith or negligent failure to settle is
determined by whether the insurer had reasonable and legitimate
grounds in law or fact, as opposed to arbitrary and capricious grounds,
to refuse to settle the third party's claim within policy limits.' 93 The
mere fact that the claim could have been settled within policy limits,
that the insurer rejected such a demand by the plaintiff, or that the
insured requested such a settlement, is not dispositive of the existence
of bad faith or negligent failure to settle. 9
Such circumstances may
be tendered at trial to further the insured's bad faith or negligence
claims, but these alone do not decide the issue of whether the insurer
acted in bad faith or was negligent.'95
In the future, insurance companies will rely heavily upon the safe
harbor language of the decision in Cotton States. When the insurer faces
a Holt demand that is conditioned upon factors beyond its control, and
the insurer has reasonably determined that the value of the claim is in
excess of its policy limits, then it can rely upon the safe harbor to tender
the policy limits to avoid any claims of bad faith or negligent failure to
settle. On the other hand, when the insurer faces a Holt demand with
conditions beyond its control, and the insurer has reasonably determined
that the value of the claim does not exceed its policy limits, the insurer
can again rely upon the safe harbor language in refusing to tender the
policy limits, and thereby avoid liability for bad faith or negligent failure
to settle.

191. Id.
192. See Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fields, 106 Ga. App. 740, 128 S.E.2d 358 (1962);
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Exum, 123 Ga. App. 515, 181 S.E.2d 704 (1971) (holding that an
insurer is not required to give greater consideration to the interests of the insured over its
own interest).
193. See Gingold v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 410, 283 S.E.2d 614 (1981).
194. Id. at 410, 283 S.E.2d at 614.
195. Id.
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B. ConstitutionalRegulation of Punitive Extra-Contractual
Exposure--State Farm v. Campbell
Although not a Georgia-grown precedent, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell'96 is controlling precedent,
specifically applicable to an insurer's potential, punitive, extra-contractual exposure. A Utah appellate court reinstated a $145 million punitive
award which had been reduced to $25 million by the trial court following
a jury trial which also resulted in a $2.6 million compensatory
award. 197 The United States Supreme Court noted that State Farm's
actions "meri[t] no praise."1 98 State Farm took a case of probable
liability to trial, against the advice of its own personnel, and incurred an
excess judgment in multiples of the coverage and the demands.
Evidence from throughout the United States regarding State Farm's
alleged national scheme to limit payments was admitted, over objection,
as was claim-handling conduct dissimilar to that involved in Campbell.1

99

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and once again considered the
measure of punishment, via punitive damages, available to a state in a
civil case.200 The Court, noting that Campbell is "neither close nor
difficult,"2 ' reversed and remanded. 0 2 Further, it carried forward
from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore213 the three guideposts
governing de novo appellate review of the measure of punitive damages
constitutionally sustainable: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3)
the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases."20 4
In an extended discussion regarding the degree of reprehensibility, the
Supreme Court made it clear that "[a] State cannot punish a defendant
for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred." 20 5 Even if
out-of-state conduct was probative regarding the deliberateness of the
defendant's action, "[a] jury must be instructed.., that it may not use
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evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that
was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred." 20 6 Moreover, the
Court prohibited states from attempting to punish "[a] defendant's
dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was
premised."20 7 It drew in the type of evidence admissible on punitive
damages to that which was substantially similar to evidence affecting a
particular plaintiff only if that conduct was not lawful where it
occurred. 20 1
Out-of-state, dissimilar,
and lawful conduct are not
209
generally evidence of reprehensibility.
Turning next to the proportionality guidepost, the Supreme Court
again discussed the absence of a bright-line or ratio rule, and suggested
that low single-digit ratios were instructive and perhaps limiting, except
in those instances when "'a particularly egregious act has resulted in
only a small amount of economic damages."'2 10 The Court suggested
that "[wihen compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost
limit of the due process guarantee."2 1' The Campbell ratio, 145:1, was
well beyond the outer limits of constitutionality. 212 Lastly, "[tjhe third
guidepost of... disparity between the punitive damages award and the
'civil penalties
in comparable cases'" 213 again identified a civil
sanction of modest amount: $10,000 for an act of fraud.21 4
It appears that many courts, including the state appellate courts, are
struggling to adjust to the Supreme Court's dampening of the historical
punitive damage free-for-all. In cases following BMW, the Georgia
appellate consideration of punitive awards' constitutionality seems to be
characterized by ad hoc rationalizations for most awards entered. With
time and the clarification in Campbell, refinements in this area should
occur. The insurance practitioner has been blessed with the concrete
United States Supreme Court application of the BMW guideposts in the
insurance extra-contractual context. Campbell should make discovery,
evidentiary rulings, jury consideration, and de novo court review of
punitive damage exposures in the insurance context much easier.
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